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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
PROOF OF MARRIAGE IN MARYLAND
By HEnBERT MYEBBEIO*
INTRODUCTION
The existence vel non of a lawful marriage is an issue
which frequently arises both in civil and criminal litigation.
The outcome of suits involving ownership of property or
the distribution of a decedent's estate very often depends
upon the proof of a marriage between the claimant and some
person through whom he claims title. Likewise, when such
cases turn upon the legitimacy of either the claimant or of
one of his parents competent and legally sufficient evidence
of a lawful marriage between his immediate or remote
ancestors must be offered. Every suit for divorce, aliena-
tion of affections and criminal conversation requires proof
of the marriage of the parties involved. No prosecution
for adultery, bigamy or wife-beating is complete without
due proof of the marriage of the principals.
Broadly speaking, marriage may be proved directly by
evidence of a marriage in fact or indirectly by evidence of
the general reputation and cohabitation of the parties, from
which it is proper to infer or presume that they were mar-
ried. Direct evidence of marriage is generally found in the
testimony of eye witnesses to the ceremony, and in the con-
tents of church registers and marriage license records.
Declarations of deceased relatives and admissions of the
parties to the alleged marriage are of equal evidential value
in proving marriage either by the direct or indirect method.1
It is generally said that any number of available methods
of proving a legal marriage may be joined for their com-
bined effect.' The practitioner should be cautious in adopt-
ing this course, however, for while there can be no objection
to supplementing indirect or presumptive evidence of a
marriage with the declarations of deceased relatives or the
Of the Baltimore City Bar. LL.B., 1931, University of Baltimore School
of Law. Lecturer (Practice Court), University of Baltimore School of Law.1 See, however. discussion of Bowman v. Little, 101 Md. 273. 61 Atl. 223,
G57, 10S4 (1,r05), and Hensel v. Smith. 152 Md. 380, 136 Atl. 0 (1927)
later in the text.
I See I Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation. See. 924.
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admissions of the parties themselves, it will be shown here-
after that an effort to combine direct proof of marriage in
fact with a presumption of marriage arising from general
reputation and cohabitation will prove fatal where the direct
evidence is insufficient to establish a marriage in fact at the
time and place relied upon.
PROOF OF MARRIAGE BY COHABITATION AND
GENERAL REPUTATION
In establishing a marriage by indirect or presumptive
evidence, such facts must be adduced as will give rise to an
inference that the parties were legally married. Thus if it
be shown that the parties cohabited ostensibly as man and
wife and demeaned themselves toward each other as such,
were received into society and were treated and generally
reputed by their friends and relatives as having that status,
the law will, in favor of morality and decency, presume that
they have been legally married." The presumptions of law
in favor of marriage, the legality of cohabitation, and the
legitimacy of children where issue have resulted from such
cohabitation all combine to make out a valid marriage.4
Originally based on the necessity of the case which arose
from the difficulty of producing direct evidence, the rule
permitting proof of marriage by cohabitation and reputation
has become a hard and fast formula of general application
independent of necessity. Accordingly, this method of
proof may be utilized notwithstanding there are qualified
witnesses within the jurisdiction having direct knowledge
Sellman v. Bowen, 8 G. & J. 51 (1835); Copes v. Pearce, 7 Gill 247
(1848) ; Fornshill v. Murray, 1 B). 479 (1828) ; Craufurd v. Blackburn, 17
Md. 49 (1841) ; Boone v. Purnell, 28 Md. 607 (18CS) ; Itedgrave v. Itedgrave,
38 Md. 93 (1873); Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251 (1875); Jones v. Jones,
45 Md. 144 (1876) ; Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391 (1878) ; Richardson v. Smith,
80 Md. 89, 30 AtL 508 (1894) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 Atl. 752
(1894) ; O'Leary v. Lawrence, 138 Md. 147, 113 Ati. 761 (1921) ; Bauder V.
Blackiston, 149 Md. 322, 131 Ati. 454 (1925): In Redgrave v. Redgrave,
supra, tbe Court said: "Indeed the most usual way of proving marriage.
except in actions for criminal conversation, and in prosecutions for bigamy,
is by general reputation, cohabitation and acknowledgment.. .". 38 Md. 97.
' Ibid. See also 2 Sebouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic
J elations, 6th Ed., See. 1247; 1 Bisbap, Marriage, Divorce and Separation,
Ch1.
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of the fact of marriage.' The evidence admissible under the
rule now discussed is not to be confused with hearsay evi-
dence nor with the exception to the exclusionary rule against
it which admits the declarations of deceased relatives in
proof of pedigree. General repute as to marriage is a
matter of fact concerning which a witness may testify just
as he does with respect to any other fact within his knowl-
edge; and such evidence is admissible either to prove or dis-
prove the marriage, depending upon whether the general
reputation of the parties on the subject is favorable or un-
favorable.T The reputation which may be shown for this
purpose, however, must be a general reputation and not a
divided or singular one.' General reputation implies the
concurrence of many voices in a common opinion as dis-
tinguished from the personal conclusions of one or two
persons, whereas a "divided reputation" may be said to be
one which is intermediate between opposites, that is partly
one way and partly another.'
5 Bauder v. Blackiston, 149 Md. 322, 131 At. 454 (1925). In this case the
appellee's right to caveat his father's will was resisted on the ground that
his mother had never been lawfully married to the decedent and therefore
the appellee was illegitimate. Relying upon cohabitation and reputation to
establish the marriage, the appellee produced his mother who testified as
to her cohabitation with the decedent and the circumstances under which
she separated from him. Not one question was asked her by either side
concerning the fact of marriage. The appellants contended that it was not
sufficient to infer marriage from habit and repute where there was a com-
petent witness available who might testify as to the facts. But the Court
said: . . . The rule has been extended to permit proof of marriage by
reputation (sic)- and repute even in cases where the evidence of persons
having direct knowledge of the fact is available, . . .". 149 Md. 325. It Is
apparent, however, from other parts (pp. 833-334) of the opinion that the
Court regarded with suspicion the failure of the caveator to examine his
mother concerning the fact of marriage.
' The value of declarations of deceased relatives in proving marriage ts
discussed further on in the text. Of course, if general reputation is sought
to be established by a witness who does not speak of his own knowledge on
the subject, the testimony will be objectionable as hearsay. See Boone v.
Purnell, 28 Md. 607, 628 (1868).
v Boone v. Purnell, supra note 6; Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 At.
752 (1894) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 34, 33 AtI. 317 (1895).
'Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251 (1875) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17,
34; O'Leary v. Lawrence, 138 Md. 147, 152, 113 AtM 761 (1921). In Jackson
v. Jackson, the Court held the following questions objectionable on the
grounds stated in the text: "Do you know of any reputation in the com-
munity of Salisbury on the subject of their marriage at the time they were
living together? If yea, was that a general reputation or a divided reputa-
tion?" "Was there or not a divided reputation in the community of Salis-
bury as to the subject of their being married, while they lived together as
man and wife?'
' Boone v. Purnell, supra note 6; Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 190.
195, 30 Al. 752 (1894) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 83, 34, 33 AtL 817
(1805).
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When proof of habit and repute is resorted to for the
purpose of establishing a marriage, the general reputation
of the woman for chastity is properly admitted in evidence,
for "the lower the standard of rectitude of the parties the
less improbable would it be that they would lead a life of
shame . .. If the character of the woman for chastity was
bad, one of the elements would be wanting which give weight
to cohabitation as one of the proofs of marriage, because it
would be evident that moral restraint would not prevent her
from living in concubinage." 1  In this connection it is also
proper to inquire into the conditions and circumstances
under which men visited at the woman's house during the
time that the parties lived together; but to be relevant, the
evidence must be confined to the woman's reputation for
chastity and to her mode of life either before the alleged
marriage or during the period she lived with the man as his
reputed wife.1 .
The cohabitation of the parties, however, may have
originated under circumstances which render inoperative
the usual presumption in favor of marriage. Thus "where
there is no impediment to marriage, and the connection be-
tween the parties was illicit in its commencement, it will be
presumed to continue to be of the same character; and in
order to overcome that presumption, it willibe necessary to
adduce other evidence than that of cohabitition of the par-
ties to establish the marriage."" It is not to be inferred,
however, that because the cohabitation of the parties is
shown to have been illicit in its inception, subsequent mar-
riage can be proved only by direct evidence of the fact of
oJackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 AtL 752 (1894). It Is clear however,
that, in the last analysis, it rests with the jury to decide whether a favor-
able or unfa-orable inference is to be drawn from the circumstances which
surrounded and characterized the cohabitation of the parties. Jackson ease,
supra, p. 193.
11 IbId, 80 Md. 195: "If the defendants could prove that the house was
kept in a disorderly and disreputable manner, It would have a tendency to
show that the intercourse between these parties was not of a virtuous
kind." And see Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 32, 33 AtI. 317 (1895).
10 Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876) ; Barnum v. Barnum, supra note 8;
Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176; 30 AtL 752 (1894) ; Glaser v. Dambmann,
82 Md. 643, 32 Atl. 522 (1895) ; O'Leary v. Lawrence, supra note 8. And
see 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Ch. 32, especially concern-
Ing the situation where an impediment to marriage existed at the com-
mencement of the cohabitation. -
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marriage."' More exactness in the proof is no doubt re-
quired, and it must be shown with some degree of certainty
when the illicit arrangement ceased and the legal relation
of husband and wife commenced. Thus in Jones v. Jones,1
it was said, concerning rebuttal of the presumption of the
continuance of an illicit relation:
"But if evidence be adduced, such as show a change
in the conduct of the parties, or a change in the manner
of treatment by their relations and friends, or other
facts which indicate that they had changed their status
before the world, and intended to make that relation
lawful which was before unlawful, though such proof
may not go to the direct proof of marriage, yet it may
be sufficient upon which to' found the presumption of
marriage. And in this case, if, after the birth of the
appellee, though born as a bastard, there was cohabita-
tion of his father and mother, the latter assuming the
name of the former, and the parties treated each other
as man and wife, and treated the appellee as their child,
and they were treated as and reputed to be man and
wife by their friends and acquaintances, these are facts
proper to be submitted to the jury, from which mar-
riage may be inferred, notwithstanding the original
illicit connection between the parties."
This statement of the law was adopted and applied in
the later case of O'Leary v. Lawrence,5 which involved the
distribution of a decedent's estate. The claimant's right to
the estate was dependent upon the legitimacy of his deceased
mother and this depended on whether the claimant's grand-
mother had been lawfully married to the decedent. The
evidence clearly showed that the relation between the par-
ties was originally illicit and that Cora, the claimant's de-
" An expression in Barnum v. Barnum, supra note 8, may be calculated
to give the impression that the Iresumptive evidence will not suffice in such
a case. It was there said with reference to cohabitation of illicit origin:
"... the presumption in such case being that the connection between the
parties continued to be illicit, until the presumption Is overcome by distinct
proof of marriage." 42 Md. 297. It is to be observed that the expression
used is "distinct proof" and not "direct proof". Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md.
176, 30 AtI. 752 (1894) is clear on the point. It is said there: "Upon the
supposition that the connection between Watson Jackson and the plaintiff's
mother was illicit at its commencement it was incumbent on the plaintiff to
show a subsequent marriage between them . . . although this may be shown
by indirect proof." And see cases quoted in the text.
.Supra note 12.
's Supra oct. S.
PROOF OF MARRIAGE
ceased mother, was born at a time when her (Cora's) mother
was cohabiting with one Wisner, while O'Leary, the dece-
dent, was boarding with them. It appeared that Cora's
mother had stated that O'Leary was her father and that
they were going to leave Wisner and go to live with
O'Leary. There was proof that, thereafter, O'Leary lived
with Cora and her mother for nearly twenty-five years, dur-
ing which time lie acknowledged Cora as his child and
treated her mother as his wife. The Court found this evi-
dence sufficient to raise an inference of marriage notwith-
standing the original illicit connection between the parties.
Presumption evidence is particularly important when we re-
member that, under the Evidence Act later to be discussed,
testimony of the surviving spouse as to the ceremony may
be inadmissible.10
Where the evidence as to the parties' general reputation
for marriage is conflicting, it is not for the Court to declare
its effect as a matter of law; but it is the jury's province to
weigh the evidence and determine the issue."' And in their
deliberations the jury is at liberty to consider such matters,
if properly in evidence, as the woman's reputation for chas-
tity; the length of time the parties lived together and held
themselves out as man and wife; the manner and circum-
stance of their coming together as man and wife; the length
16 Md. Code, Art. 35, Sec. 3. See Dennison v. Dennison, 35 Md. 361
(1872), where the suit was between the alleged wife.of an intestate and his
administrator and involved her right to a distributive share of the dece-
dent's estate; Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md. 93 (1873), where the alleged
wife of a decedent sGught letters of administr lton on his estate over the
objection of the decedent's father; Brooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524 (1884), a
bill for dower by the alleged wife of a decedent; Bowman v. Little, 101 Md.
273, 61 AtL 223, 657, 1084 (1905), involving the right of an alleged wife of a
decedent to obtain a share of his estate and to set aside for fraud an assign-
ment and release thereof made to the administrator and the decedent's
mother. See Craufurd v. Blackburn, 17 Md. 49 (1861), where the appel-
lant's right to administer on the estate of a deceased uncle was dependent
upon the existence of a valid marriage between the appellant's mother and
decedent's brother. The appellant's mother was not a party to the cause
and she was permitted to testify notwithstanding her alleged husband was
dead.
See also Bauder v. Blackiston, supra note 5, where the appellee's right to
caveat his father's will depended upon the existence of a valid marriage
between the decedent and the appellee's mother, whose testimony was ad-
mitted in the case. It is to be observed, however, that since the suit was
a caveat proceeding, Md. Code, Art. 35, See. 3, was inapplicable. The alleged
wife would thus have been a competent witness even if she had been a
party to the cause. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 131 Md. 508, 102 AtM 761
(1917) ; Hendrickson v. Attick, 136 Md. 1, 7, 109 AtL 468 (1920).
%'Jackson v. Jackson, supra note 12; O'Leary v. Lawrence, supra note -.
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of time they lived apart; their conduct, habits and circum-
stances since their separation; the declarations of either of
them during their separation; and the manner in which they
were received and treated by their respective families and
the communities in which they lived during the time of their
cohabitation and the years of their separation. For, as the
Court said in Jackson v. Jackson:1$
"All these -matters tended to show the nature of the
connection between the parties, and were important in
enabling the jury to determine whether the cohabitation
was pure and innocent, according to the proprieties of
married life, or whether it was licentious. If the ap-
pearances and circumstances indicated virtue and re-
spectability, they would be favorable to the inference of
marriage; but if they bore the marks of incontinence
and depravity, the tendency would be to the contrary."
PROOF OF MARRIAGE BY DIRECT EVIDENCE
Direct evidence of marriage as a fact, if obtainable at all,
is most frequently found in the testimony of eye witnesses
to the ceremony or in such documentary evidence as mar-
riage records and certificates, church registers and the like.
Unless disqualified by some rule of evidence, any one pres-
ent at the solemnization of the marriage, whether as a mere
spectator, celebrant or party to the ceremony, may testify
to the fact of marriage.1' With respect to the parties to
the marriage, however, it must be recalled that under the
Evidence Act if one of the parties is dead and the other
is a party to the cause, the latter is incompetent as a witness
for the purpose of proving the marriage.2 And since the
statutory disqualification extends to every part of the trans-
action with the decedent, the survivor may not, by his own
testimony, establish his identity as one of the parties to a
marriage certificate. 1 There is, of course, no absolute re-
z' Supra note 12, 138 Md. 193.
IS 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation. Sees. 1047-1019; Glaser v..
Dambmann, supra note 12, where the justice of the peace who performed
the ceremony and a person who was present testified.
20 See supra note 16. See also Brooke v. Brooke, Ibid; Bowman v. Little,
Ibid.
"1 Bowman v. Little, supra note 16. In addition to the prohibition of the
Evidence Act, the rule with respect to establishing the identity of the
parties named in the marriage certificate requires that "the identity of the
parties must be proved by other testimony than that of the parties them-
selves". Bowman v. Little, supra.
PROOF OF MARRIAGE
quirement that all eye witnesses within the jurisdiction be
called to establish the fact of marriage. Indeed, as we have
already seen, it is permissible to prove a marriage by in-
direct or presumptive evidence even though one of the par-
ties to the marriage is within the jurisdiction and is a com-
petent witness."2
Duly authenticated documentary evidence together with
adequate identification of the parties named therein is a
proper method of proving a marriage by direct evidence.
For this purpose marriage records, licenses and certificates
and church registers, whether of this State or another State,
are admissible," if properly authenticated. With respect
to the records of another State or Country, required by the
law of such State or Country to be made and preserved, the
Evidence Act provides for the mode of their being proved.2
In Glaser v. Dainbmann..5 the Court said regarding a certi-
fied copy of the marriage license and certificate from the
records of the State of Alabama: "In the absence of proof
against the genuineness of this license, the certified copy
from the marriage records is presumptive evidence of the
marriage." Concerning the marriage records of this State,
the statute provides that a certified copy of the record of a
marriage license and certificate, or of the certificate required
to be returned in cases where marriage is celebrated after
the publication of banns, is admissible as prima facie evi-
dence of the marriage between the parties."
"2 Bauder v. Blackiston, supra note 5.
2111 Bishop, Marriage. Divorce and Separation. Ch. 33, Sees. 986. et seq.;
1 Vernier, Americin Family Laws, Sec. 36, p. 161: Shorter v. Boswell, 2 H.
& J. 360 (180): Barnum v, Barnum. supra note 8: Weaver v. Lelman, 52
Md. 708, 720 (1870) ; Blackburn v. Crawford. 3 Wall 175, 18 Law Ed. 186
(1866) ; Brooke v. Brooke, supra note 16: Glaser v. Dambmann. supra note
12; Bowman v. Little, supra note 16; Ilensel v. Smith. 152 Md. 380, 136
AtI. 900 (1927).
2 "Md. Code, Art. 35, See. 45. It will be observed that under the Full
Faith and Credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. 4. See. 1) the
public records of other States, as distinguished from those of foreign
countries, would be admissible even in the absence of the provisions of the
Evidence Act, snpra. if authenticated in accordance with U. S. C. A., Title
28. See. 687. And see In re Peterson's Estate, 22 N. Dak. 480, 134 N. W.
751. 761 (1912).
11 Supra note 12. 32 AtI. 524. Three judges dissented in this case and.
among other things, said that in view of the suspicions circumstances sur-
rounding the Issuance and return of the license, some affirmative proof of
its genuineness should have been offered.
24 Md. Code, Art. 62. Sees. 9. 12: Md. Code, Art. 3, Sec. 67.
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But the production of such documentary evidence without
more does not suffice to establish the particular marriage in
issue. The law requires evidence of the identity of the par-
ties beyond the mere statements contained in the certifi-
cate."' The man and woman named in the record must be
shown to be the same man and woman whose marriage is in
question. Sunh identity may be established in a variety of
ways. Thus it is adequate for this purpose to produce eye
witnesses to the marriage who are either acquainted with
the married couple, or who can identify them by the use of
photographs, and a comparison of handwriting may be made
where the parties have signed the application for license.28
On the question of the admissibility and legal sufficiency
of certain types of circumstantial evidence as an aid in
identifying the parties named in the marriage certificate or
license, the two leading cases of Bowman v. Little," and
Hensel v. Smith,s0 present an apparent diversity of opinion.
In Bowman v. Little, it appeared that G. Walter Bowman
of Hagerstown, died in 1903 leaving a widow, Lettie E. Bow-
man (to whom, it was conceded, he had actually been mar-
ried in 1900) and a child, the issue of said marriage. The
plaintiff, Catherine E. McGranagan, alleging that she was
the lawful widow of the decedent by a former marriage, filed
her claim for a share of his estate. To establish her mar-
riage, the plaintiff offered the certificate of a clergyman in
Camden, N. J., setting forth that in 1887 he had married one
"George W. Bowman of Haleystown, Maryland to one
Catherine McGranagan"; also the testimony of her mother
that Bowman had told her that he had married her daugh-
ter; that she had visited them for a few days when they were
living at a certain house, and also the testimony of a physi-
cian that when employed to attend the plaintiff, Bowman
stated that she was his wife. A nephew testified to similar
admissions. Chief Judge McSherry, delivering the major-
ity opinion of the Court and a supplemental opinion in an-
swer to Judge Pearce's vigorous dissent, held that the plain-
Bowman v. Little. supra note 10; Hensel v. Smith, supra note 23; 1
Bishop, op. cit. supra note 19, Sec. 1016.
2 Glaser v. Dambmann, supra note 12; Brooke v. Brooke, supra note 16:
Hensel v. Smith, supra note 23; Md. Code, Art. 35, See. 7.
11 Supra note 16.
00 Supra note 23.
128
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tiff had offered no evidence legally sufficient to establish the
identity of the parties named in the marriage certificate
and that her case should have been withdrawn from the
jury. "As already indicated," the Chief Judge said,81
"George W. Bowman as named in the certificate is by no
means identical with G. Walter Bowman, the deceased, and
no inference can be drawn that these two designations
point out the same individual; especially when that dis-
similarity is appealed to as evidencing an identity, which,
if established in that way, would overthrow the strong pre-
sumptions in favor of innocence and legitimacy." So strong
are the presumptions that Bowman was innocent of the
crime of bigamy and that the child by his second marriage
was legitimate that unless the evidence is "sufficient to
establish a mental conviction which amounts to a moral cer-
tainty," the presumptions of innocence and legitimacy pre-
vail as a matter of law, and the case cannot go to the jury.
That since the strict burden of establishing to a moral cer-
tainty the identity of the parties named in the certificate
could not be met by the testimony of the parties themselves,
a fortiori, it could not be met by showing their admissions
or declarations."2  Accordingly, the testimony of the plain-
tiff's mother, the physician and the decedent's nephew to
the effect that the decedent had told them he was married to
the plaintiff was insufficient to carry the case to the jury.
And the plaintiff's mother's testimony as to the parties hav-
ing cohabited as man and wife was irrelevant because an
antecedent marriage will not be presumed from cohabitation
where to do so will render void a second marriage formally
solemnized.
In Hensel v. Smith, the plaintiff, Elsa Dugent Smith, filed
a claim in the Orphans' Court for a widow's share of the
estate of G. Edgar Smith, deceased. The appellants con-
tended that he had died unmarried and without issue. It is
thus apparent that there were no presumptions of innocence
&1101 Md. 292.
83 Cf. Brooke v. Brooke, supra note 16, holding admissible declarations of
the decedent to the effect that he was never married; and Glaser v. Damb-
mann. supra note 12. where the admissions of the decedent were considered
corroborative. In both these cases, however, there were no presumptions
of innocence and legitimacy to be overcome, and there was adequate evi-
dence tending to establish the identity of the parties. See also Hensel v.
Smith, supra note 23, discussed In the tert.
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or legitimacy to be overcome as in Bowman v. Little. Mar-
riage as a fact in Delaware was relied upon. The appellee
produced an application for a marriage license signed by
"G. E. Smith" and the license issued in pursuance thereof
authorizing the marriage of "George E. Smith to Elsie G.
Dugent." The decedent was generally known as "G. Edgar
Smith." There was also offered in evidence the marriage
records of a Delaware church which showed that George
Edgar Smith had been married there on the same day the
license was issued. The appellee's sister testified over
objection that the decedent had declared to her that he and
her sister had been married and that it was to be kept secret.
To the rest of the world, the parties appeared as unmarried,
and the testimony of third persons was that they knew both
parties as single. The Court pointed out that it was not
called upon to determine whether the evidence was sufficient
to establish the marriage-this was the jury's province, if
the case was a proper one to be submitted to them at all.
In holding the evidence in the case legally sufficient to go
to the jury, the Court said:"' "The criticism of the names
in the Bowman marriage certificate by Judge McSherry
cannot apply to the marriage record before us, which, to-
gether with the other evidence as to the identity of the
parents of the parties, and of those named in the license ap-
plication, was properly submitted to the jury." The Court
then held admissible the declarations of the decedent made
to the appellee's sister to the effect that he and the appellee
had been married but wanted it kept secret. Against the
admissibility of such evidence, the appellants urged Bowman
v. Little, where as we have seen it was apparently held that
under the circumstances of that case the declarations of one
of the parties was not admissible to prove identity of the par.
ties named in the certificate. To this objection the Court
said:" "We are of the opinion that the rule laid down in
Bowman v. Little does not apply in this case, but that the law
is, as stated by Judge Bartol in Craufurdv. Blackburn, as fbl-
lows: ... 'where the question is marriage vel non, the dec-
larations of the parties themselves, if deceased, that they
,a 152 Md. S88.
Ibld, 389.
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were or were not married, provided they were made ante
litem uzotem are admissible evidence of the fact declared'."
The Court then pointed out 5 that the exclusion in Bowman
v. Little of the admissions and declarations of the parties
and the requirement that identity be proved by other testi-
mony was definitely influenced by the fact that "if the claim
had been successful, it would have resulted in bastardizing
the offspring of the second marriage."
There can be little doubt that the rulings in the two cases
just discussed are diametrically opposed when considered'
.apart from the particular facts and circumstances to which
they were respectively applied. In one a variation in the
spelling of the parties' names in the marriage certificate
was virtually fatal; in the other no importance was attached
to this circumstance. The Bowman case refused to con-
sider the admissions and declarations of the parties; the
Hensel case, in accordance with what appears to have been
the practice in earlier decisions, receives such admissions
and declarations. But in this connection it must be ob-
served that in both of these cases the problem was not one
as to the admissibility of the evidence but simply as to its
legal sufficiency."s We may well inquire, nevertheless, why
virtually the same evidence should be sufficient in the one
instance to carry the case to the jury and insufficient in the
other. Certain observations of Chief Judge McSherry in
the Bowman case offer a solution of the problem as well as
a rational basis for applying the respective principles of
these decisions to varying factual situations. He said:"
"The standard or measure by which the legal sufficiency of
evidence is ascertained is not unvarying and inflexible, and
hence is not the same in every case. That which would be
legally sufficient to establish a marriage when nothing but
the mere question of marriage vel non is presented, would
not necessarily be legally sufficient to establish a prior mar-
29 Ibid, 390.
"1 Thus Chief Judge Mcherry. In his supplemental opinion in Bowman
v. Little, said: "The controlling question was there any legally sufficient
evidence to go to the Jury it the circumstances of this case, to establish the
Identity of the persons named In the New Jersey marriage certificate. It
was therefore a question of the legal suiciency of the evidence and not of




riage when the consequence incident to upholding the latter
would be to convict one of the parties of crime or to bastard-
ize the offspring of a subsequent marriage; because the con-
ditions are essentially different and .because in the one in-
stance there may, and most likely would be, no presumptions
either in favor of or against a marriage, whilst in the other
there will always be most important presumptions in the'
favor of innocence and legitimacy."
Thus in Bowman v. Little the plaintiff's claim was in
opposition to the presumption that the decedent was inno-
cent of the crime of bigamy and the presumption of the
legitimacy of his child by the second marriage. In Hensel
v. Smith there was no second marriage to be invalidated
nor issue thereof to be bastardized by the establishment of
the plaintiff's claim, and accordingly, there were no pre-
sumptions of innocence or legitimacy to be overcome by
"evidence which establishes a mental conviction amounting
to a moral certainty," as was the case in Bowman v. Little.
Indeed, in the Heitsel case the general presumption in favor
of marriage strengthened the plaintiff's claim, whereas in
the Bowman case this same presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's first marriage was in conffict -with and had to
yield to the stronger presumptions of innocence and legiti-
macy." Thus in cases where these stronger presumptions
are operative a slight variance in the spelling of names is
sufficient to prevent application of the rule which is ordi-
narily applied in the absence of such presumptions, namely,
that identity of names is prima facie evidence of the identity
of the persons, and similarly, the sufficiency of the ad-
missions and declarations of the parties to establish their
identity as the persons named in the proffered marriage
records will depend upon whether or not the strong pre-
sumptions in favor of innocence and legitimacy would be
overthrown if such identity should be established.
Although proof of marriage by direct evidence has cer-
tain manifest advantages over proof by indirect or pre-
sumptive evidence, the practitioner should not lose sight of
the dangers inherent in the former method. The law is
"The effect when presumptions are conflicting Is diecussed later in the
text.
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well settled in this State that where the party asserting the
validity of a marriage relies upon a particular form or cere-
mony, performed at a definite time and place, and fails to
prove that, he cannot afterwards rely upon general reputa-
tion and cohabitation to establish it.39 In addition, where
marriage in fact is relied upon, the failure to produce or
account for the absence of a certificate of the marriage is
regarded as a suspicious circumstance which tends to dis-
prove the marriage." It is thus apparent that in cases
where it is felt that the available evidence of marriage in
fact is weak or where the absence of a marriage certificate
cannot be properly accounted for, the safer course to follow
is to rely first on the presumption arising from cohabitation
and reputation, if such proof is available." If this fails,
resort may then be had to direct evidence of marriage in fact.
There are, however, certain types of cases in which the
procedure suggested cannot be followed. In civil actions
for criminal conversation and in criminal prosecutions for
bigamy or adultery the law requires that the marriage be
established as a fact by direct evidence.4 And, as we have
seen, where a subsequent marriage in fact is shown,.a prior.
"'Blackburn v. Crawford, supra note 23; Redgrave v. Redgrave, supra
note 16; Barnum v. Barnum, supra note 8; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17,
33 AtI. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773 (1895); Bowman v. Little, supra note 16;
Bander v. Blackiston, supra note 5.
"Barnum v. Barnum. supra note S; Schaffer v. Richardson, 125 Md. 88.
93 Ati. 391, L. R. A. 1915 E. 186 (1915). The basis of this rule lies in the
fact that a clergyman or other celebrant of the marriage is presumed to
have performed his duty to file a certificate of the marriage with the proper
authorities as required by the law of almost every jurisdiction in the
United States.
1 In Bauder v. Blackiston, supra note 5, counsel appear to have followed
this method. Although the surviving spouse was a competent witness in
the case (it being a caveat proceeding), she was not asked one question
concerning the form, time or place of the alleged marrriage. Her testimony
was carefully confined to her cohabitation with the decedent. And this
evidence, together with the supporting testimony of third persons as to the
general reputation of the parties, was held sufficient to establish the mar-
riage. In Bowman v. Little, supra note 16, the method suggested could
not have been followed because a subsequent marriage in fact having been
rhown, direct evidence of the prior marriage was essential. And In Hensel
v. Smith. supra note 23, there was no available evidence that the parties
bad cohabited or were reputed to be married.
"Sellman v. Bowman, 8 G. & J. 51 (1836) ; Redgrave v. Redgrave, supra
note 16; Barnum v. Barnum, supra note 8; Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176,
30 AtL 752 (1894). See also Fornshill v. Murray, 1 BI. 479 (1828) ; 1 Bishop.
op. cit. supra note 19, Sees. 1036-1038, 1064. It is to be observed, however,
that in prosecutions for wife-beating the marriage may be established by
presumptive evidence because of the necessity of the case. Hanon v. State,
63 Md. 123 (1885).
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marriage must be proved by direct evidence of the clearest
kind." In these cases the practitioner has no alternative
since proof of marriage by habit and repute alone is insuffi-
cient.
DECLARATIOINS OF DECEASED IE'LATIVES AND
ADMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Hearsay Rule and the exceptions to it belong more
properly to the law of Evidence. The pertinency, however,
of the exception to that rule which admits declarations of
deceased relatives in proof of "pedigree" renders a dis-
cussion of the subject appropriate here. The Hearsay Rule
may be thus stated: Where a witness, in testifying as to
the existence of a fact, purports to speak, not of his own
knowledge, but of what another person told him concerning
it, the evidence will not be received. "But it is one of the
well recognized exceptions to the general rule excluding
hearsay evidence, that in matters of pedigree, embracing
marriages and births, hearsay is admissible, provided it
proceeds from persons who are 'de jure related by blood or
marriage to the family in question, and who, consequently,
may be supposed to have had the greatest interest in seek-
ing, the best opportunities for obtaining, and least reason
for falsifying, information on the subject'.'"' Before a
witness may testify, however, as to what another told him
concerning the existence of the marriage in question, it must
be shown by independent evidence that the declarant is
dead, that he was related by blood or marriage to the person
whose marriage is in issue (or with whom relationship is
sought to be established) and that the declaration was made
ante litem motaM.4" Thus, it is improper for the plaintiff
to offer the declarations of her deceased maternw2 grand-
mother to prove that she was the legitimate child of a dece-
"' Jones v. .Tones, 45 Md. 144 (1876) ; Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391 (1878) ;
Bowman v. Little. supra note 16 (discussed at length in the text) ; O'Leary
v. Lawrence. supra note 8.
"Barnum v. Barnnm, supra note 8. In this case, in order to disprove
the marriage of a decedent, witnesses were permitted to testify that the
decedent's deceased mother had declared, prior to the suit, that the son waq
not married and that his child was illegitimate.
"5 Copes v. Pearce, 7 Gill 247 (1848) : Craufurd v. Blackburn, supra note
16; Blackburn v. Crawford, supra note 23; Boone v. Purnell. supra note 6;
Barnum v. Barnum. supra note 8: Jackson v. Jackson. 80 Md. 176. 30 Ati.
752 (1894).
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dent or the declarations of a viatcrnal aunt whTe the case
involves the distribution of the estate of a deceased brother
of the putative father, although the declaration of the latter
would be admissible because of his relation to the party
whose estate is in question."0
It has already been observed in the discussion of Hensel
v. Smith, 7 that the admissions and the declarations of the
husband and wife are admissible to prove their marriage.S
If the spouse is dead and the question arises in a collateral
proceeding, the declaration is admissible on the same ground
and subject to the same limitations as declarations by de-
ceased relatives, discussed above."' Where, however, the
spouse is alive and a party to the suit, the statement is re-
ceived in evidence as an admission or confession indepen-
dently of the "pedigree" exception to the hearsay rule.50
6 Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 Atl. 752 (1894). Blackburn v.
Crawford, supra note 23, where the Court said: ". . . the declarations of
a person belonging to another family-such person claiming to be connected
with the family only by the inter-marriage of a member of each family-
rests upon a different principle. A declaration from such a source of the
marriage which constitutes the affinity of the declarant, is not such evi-
dence aliinde as the law requires." In Copes v. Pearce, supra note 45, the
Court said: ". . . the declarations of deceased members of the family,
whether relations or conncctions by ,marriage, are admissible to prove rela-
tionships, deaths, or marriages." (Italics supplied.) The matter italicized
is not In conflict with the Blackburn case, supra note 23. The ruling there
would have been otherwise if the declarant had been a paternal aunt,
though related to the putative father only through marriage with his
brother. In such a case the declarant's relationship to the decedent would
not depend upon the establishment of the very marriage in proof of which
her declaration was offered. She would be a member of his family
(through another and uncontroverted marriage) whether the marriage at
issue were established or not. But in Blackburn case, the declarant's
relationship was dependent upon the marriage which her declaration sought
to prove. And see Craufurd v. Blackburn, supra note 1&
" Supra note 23.
Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 AUt. 635 (1923) ; Hensel v. Smith, supra
note 23; Brooke v. Brooke, supra note 16; Glaser v. Dambmann supra note
12; Cf. Bowman v. Little, supra note 16. In order that there may be no
uncertainty as to what effect the decision in Bowman v. Little has on the
admissibility of such declarations, it should be recalled that the problem
there involved a "question of the legal sufficlency of the evidence and not of
Its admissibility."
'" Craufurd v. Blackburn, supra note 16; Hensel v. Smith, supra note 23;
Brell v. Brell, supra note 48.
6o ibid. See also on proof by declarations or admissions Jones v. Jones,
supra note 12; and Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708 (1879), which hold that
a family Bible is admissible in proof of pedigree, if produced from the
proper custody. Craufurd v. Blackburn, supra note 16, holds a reference
in the will of the putative father to his "natural children" admissible to
disprove the existence of a marriage between the testator and the mother
of his "natural children". Copes v. Pearce, supra note 45; and Jackson v.
Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 Atl. 752 (1894), hold admissible the fact that a
man recognized a child as his legitimate son and brought him up as such,
as an admission In pals, so to speak, that the child-ls legitinate and that
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EFFECT WHEN PRESUmpTioNs ARE CONFLICTING
In the preceding paragraphs we noticed how a variety
of legal presumptions may combine to establish a valid mar-
riage or to show that one never existed. It will sometimes
be found that in one case the same presumption (in favor of.
marriage or innocence) may be applicable with equal force
to two or more cohabitations. Likewise, with respect to
such cohabitations, a number. of presumptions may be in
direct conflict when applied to the several cohabitations. It
may be stated generally that in these cases (where the effect
of a presumption is either neutralized by its applicability
to two or more cohabitations or is in conflict with another
presumption) the law requires that the marriage in issue
be established as a fact by direct evidence. 51 Reference has
already been made to the instances in which proof of mar-
riage by direct evidence is required.
Let us assume that, on an issue of marriage vel non, co-
habitation of two parties as man and wife is shown and
there is also shown a simultaneous cohabitation of one of
them with a third person under like circumstances. In such
a case a presumption in favor of marriage and innocence
in the cohabitation applies with equal force to both cohabi-
tations. "As it is impossible for the two marriages to sub-
sist together, neither is by this evidence established, though
the part of the evidence alone would set up either. For
here one presumption of innocence antagonizes with equal
force another presumption of innocence, and the two con-
joined fail." 2  Direct evidence would then be necessary to
establish either marriage.
the parents were lawfully married. The latter case also holds that a wit-
ness may not testify that he had never heard the decedent say that he was
married or had a child, since the failure to make a declaration is not
evidence.
51 1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 19. Sees. 1031, 1034, et seq., 1004. Jones
v. Jones, supra note 12: Jones v. Jones, 48 Md. 391 (1878); Bowman v.
Little, supra note 16; O'Leary v. Lawrence, supra note &
"1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 19, See. 1026. At Sec. 1028, Mr. Bishop
says: "If while three persons are living, two of them cohabit matri-
monially, then separate and one of them and third do the same, and this
and no more is proved, there is no sufficient ground to infer from either
cohabitation a valid marriage." It would seem, however, that in such a
case a marriage may properly be inferred from additional circumstances
without direct evidence of marriage In fact. Thus see O'Leary v. Lawrence,
supra note 8, discussed in the test.
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In Jones v. Jones." the legitimacy of one Henry Jones
was in issue. Henry relied upon the presumption in favor
of marriage arising from the cohabitation of his mother
with the putative father, Andrew Jones. The evidence in
the case showed, however, that subsequent to the cohabita-
tion relied upon, Andrew Jones had actually married one
Frances Moore. Thus the claimant sought to overthrow a
marriage in fact by showing (on the strength of cohabita-
tion and reputation alone) a pre-existing marriage of one
of the parties. The Court said:5"
in case of conflicting presumptions, the one in
favor of innocence shall prevail. If then, it be found
as a fact . . . that Andrew D. Jones was married . . .
to Frances Moore during the life of . . . the mother of
the appellee (there being no evidence of any divorce)5"
all mere presumption of previous marriage with the
latter, founded simply upon habit and repute, is at once
overthrown, and it then becomes incumbent upon the
appellee to establish the alleged marriage of his mother
to Andrew D. Jones as an actual fact, by more direct
proof."
Upon a second appeal of this same case, the Court said,'4
with respect to its earlier decision:
"The reasoning upon which this decision rests is
that in such a case the presumption of a marriage aris-
ing from cohabitation and repute is met and overcome
by the stronger presumption, that a man will not incur
the guilt of felony and the danger which attends it by
marrying another woman during the life of the one to
whom he had previously been lawfully married."5'
In a proper ease, where a party is shown to have con-
tracted two successive marriages in fact, a presumption of
validity, operating in favor of the second marriage, raises
' Supra note 12.
,Ibid. 45 Md. 159.
's As will be shown later in the text, a divorce may be presumed In a
proper case. Schaffer v. Richardson, supra note 40.5048 Md. 391, 398 (1878).
S'The Court examined the additional evidence adduced at the second
trial and found that it went no further than to establish the first marriage
by general repute and habit. Accordingly, the decision below. holding the
appellant illegitimate, was affirmed. The doctrine of the Jones case Is
well established in this State. Thus see Bowman v. Little, supra note 16;
O'Leary v. Lawrence. supra note 8.
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an inference that the first marriage was dissolved by death
or divorce.58 Here the presumptions of morality and inno-
cence in the second marriage prevail over the conflicting
presumptions of the continuance of life and of marriage.
The rule is thus stated in Schaffer v. Richardson:9
"The tendency of the Courts is to hold the second"
marriage valid especially if there is issue which may be
bastardized by a contrary holding, and if the marriage
has not been questioned for many years its validity will
not be overcome by the-mere proof of a prior marriage.
. . . 'In such a case it has been presumed that the first
marriage has been dissolved by divorce, and that the
burden to show that it has not rests on the person seek-
ing to impeach the last marriage, notwithstanding he is
thereby required to prove a negative. Here, the pre-
sumption of the continuance of the first marriave is
made to yield to the presumption in favor of the valid-
ity of the second marriage and of the innocence of the
parties to it.'
The case of Jones v. Jones, discussed above, is sometimes
cited as opposed to the doctrine just explained." But it is
apparent that the doctrine has no application to such facts
as were presented in the Jones case, where the existence of
the first marriage was in question and the presumption aris-
ing from habit and repute was relied upon to support it in
the face of a subsequent marriage in fact. There, different
presumptions were operative. In the Schaffer case, where
the doctrine was applied, both marriages were shown as a
fact, and, the question being whether the first marriage had
been dissolved, all operative presumptions were directed
to that issue rather than to the issue of marriage vel non.
5 1 Bishop, op. cit. note 19, Sees. 951-954, 959, 1145, 1148; In re Estate
of Jackson, 1 Baltimore City Reports 410 (184) ; Schaffer v. Richardson,
supra note 40; Blanchsrd v. Lambert, 43 Iowa 228 (1876) ; Carroll v. Car-
roll, 20 Tex. 732 (1858); note (1928) 23 II. Law Rev. 188; note in 34
A. L. R. 464, supplemented in 77 A. L. R. 229: Cf. Ellis v. Ellis, 58 Iowa 720,
13 N. W. 65 (1882).
5, Supra note 40. 125 Md. 92-93
6o See II Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations,(6th Ed.), Sec. 1247, n. 67.
